




































© 2003 Bernard Caillaud, Jacques Robert. Tous droits réservés. All rights reserved. Reproduction partielle 
permise avec citation du document source, incluant la notice ©. 










  2003s-31  
 
Implementing the Optimal 
Auction 
 
Bernard Caillaud, Jacques Robert CIRANO 
Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le 
financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisations-
membres, d’une subvention d’infrastructure du ministère de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie, de 
même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche. 
CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies Act. Its infrastructure 
and research activities are funded through fees paid by member organizations, an infrastructure grant from the 
Ministère de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie, and grants and research mandates obtained by its 
research teams. 
Les organisations-partenaires / The Partner Organizations 
 
PARTENAIRE MAJEUR 
. Ministère du développement économique et régional [MDER] 
 
PARTENAIRES 
. Alcan inc. 
. Axa Canada 
. Banque du Canada 
. Banque Laurentienne du Canada 
. Banque Nationale du Canada 
. Banque Royale du Canada 
. Bell Canada 
. Bombardier 
. Bourse de Montréal 
. Développement des ressources humaines Canada [DRHC] 
. Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec 
. Gaz Métropolitain 
. Hydro-Québec 
. Industrie Canada 
. Ministère des Finances [MF] 
. Pratt & Whitney Canada Inc. 
. Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton 
. Ville de Montréal 
 
. École Polytechnique de Montréal 
. HEC Montréal 
. Université Concordia 
. Université de Montréal 
. Université du Québec à Montréal 
. Université Laval 
. Université McGill 
 
ASSOCIÉ AU : 
. Institut de Finance Mathématique de Montréal (IFM
2) 
. Laboratoires universitaires Bell Canada 
. Réseau de calcul et de  modélisation mathématique [RCM
2] 
. Réseau de centres d’excellence MITACS (Les mathématiques des technologies de l’information et des systèmes complexes) 
 
ISSN 1198-8177 
Les cahiers de la série scientifique (CS) visent à rendre accessibles des résultats de recherche effectuée au 
CIRANO afin de susciter échanges et commentaires. Ces cahiers sont écrits dans le style des publications scientifiques. 
Les idées et les opinions émises sont sous l’unique responsabilité des auteurs et ne représentent pas nécessairement les 
positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires. 
This paper presents research carried out at CIRANO and aims at encouraging discussion and comment. The 
observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent 








Résumé / Abstract 
 
 
Dans un cadre du modèle d’enchères avec des valeurs privées indépendantes, 
nous proposons un jeu, ayant une interprétation économique simple, qui permet de 
mettre en oeuvre les enchères optimales même quand le vendeur ignore les 
distributions des volontés à payer des différents soumissionnaires. Dans cette 
procédure robuste (detail-free), une enchère au deuxième prix est organisée et le 
gagnant de cette enchère propose un paiement au vendeur; ce paiement peut alors être 
contesté par un autre soumissionnaire qui connaît la distribution de l'évaluation du 
gagnant. 
 




In a general framework with independent private values of the bidders, we 
propose a game, with a simple economic interpretation, that allows implementing the 
optimal auction outcome when the seller ignores the distributions of the different 
bidders’ valuations. In this robust or detail-free implementation procedure, a second-
price auction is organized and the winner volunteers a payment to the seller; this 
payment can then be challenged by another bidder who knows the distribution of the 
winner’s valuation.  
  
Keywords: Auction, mechanism design, Wilson doctrine. 
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Since the late seventies, the mechanism design literature has been successful is de-
termining the form and properties of desirable institutions in situations where infor-
mational problems arise.1 As a leading example, Myerson [1981] characterizes the
revenue-maximizing auction when potential buyers have private and independent
valuations for the good on sale and are risk-neutral.
The mechanism design approach has however been criticized on the following
grounds. First, optimal institutions, as derived by this approach, are often much
more complex than real-life institutions. For example, the optimal auction mech-
anism with ex ante asymmetric participants or in the non-regular case turns out
to be much more complicated than a simple ﬁrst or second-price auction. Second
and most importantly, the mechanism design approach is said to be information-
ally demanding: the design of optimal institutions requires an unrealistic degree of
knowledge concerning details of the economic environment. For example, even in
the symmetric and regular framework, the optimal auction requires the appropriate
choice of the reserve price that strongly depends upon the knowledge of the prior dis-
tribution of tastes in the population of potential bidders. In repeated environments,
simulation-based estimation methods can help ﬁgure out the objective distribution
of tastes in a stable population,2 although they usually miss the strategic dimension
that is precisely due to this repeated-game setting. But for unusual auction situa-
tions (defense procurement, auction for monopoly franchises...), the crucial data are
missing. The spirit of the so-called Wilson Doctrine has then been to ask for ro-
bustness, that is to try to reach detail-free conclusions within the mechanism design
approach.
In this paper, we take these critiques seriously and we look for a detail-free im-
plementation procedure of the optimal auction in Myerson’s framework. We propose
1See e.g. the recent experiences of spectrum auctions in the US (Cramton [1995], McAfee-
McMillan [1996]) and the UK (Binmore-Klemperer [2002], Klemperer [2002]).
2See among others Laﬀont-Ossard-Vuong [1995] and Donald-Paarsch [1996]. McAfee-Quan-
Vincent [1996] uses econometric estimations to calculate the optimal reserve prices in housing
auctions.
2and analyze a game that could be designed by an ignorant seller who has no infor-
mation not only on the bidders’ valuations but also on the objective distributions
of these valuations. Assuming that, for each bidder i, there exists one other bidder
who knows the objective distribution of bidder i’s valuation, the game relies on the
possibility of challenges, in the spirit of Moore-Repullo [1988] and Glazer-Ma [1989],
and it provides a way to implement the revenue-maximizing auction with an easy
economic interpretation.
We start from the well-known implemenation of the optimal revenue-maximizing
auction through an ascending-price auction, where the winner is asked to pay a price
according to a pre-speciﬁed formula conditional on the winning bid. In the spirit of
Bulow-Roberts [1989], this price can be viewed as a monopolistic pricing decision
against the winner of the auction, where the monopolist’s cost is determined by
the winning bid in the auction. In order to do so, the seller needs to be able to
compute the optimal monopoly price for each participant; but she cannot do so
when she is ignorant, that is, when she has no knowledge of the distribution of
private information.
So, we look for a mechanism that is independent of the parameters of the prob-
lem, but nevertheless achieves the maximal revenue for the seller. We simply assume
that it is common knowledge that one bidder j 6= i knows the distribution of bid-
der i’s valuation.3 Formally, we are looking for game forms that are independent
of the distribution of types and which induce as an equilibrium the desired optimal
allocation: we call this a universal implementation procedure of the optimal auction.
The game we propose has the following relatively simple structure: (i) an ascending-
price auction is organized and the winner and the winning bid are made public in-
formation; (ii) the winner of this auction then volunteers a payment to the seller
that is also publicly disclosed; (iii) another participant who knows the distribution
of the winner’s type is then allowed to challenge the volunteered price, by making a
3Our strong results enable us to dispense with an explicit Bayesian setting where bidders’ private
information not only concerns their own valuation but also their ﬁrst-degree beliefs on each others’
valuations (see Harsanyi [1968] and Mertens-Zamir [1985]).
3take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer at a higher price to the ascending-auction winner. This game
admits an equilibrium that generates, for all distributions of bidders’ valuations, the
revenue-maximizing auction outcome. In this equilibrium, instead of charging a mo-
nopolistic price against the winner, the seller delegates this right to another bidder
who has the relevant piece of information in order to solve the monopolistic pricing
problem. The threat of having to face this monopoly price anyway induces the win-
ner of the ascending auction to volunteer this payment, so as to avoid a fee involved
in case of a challenge.
The standard characterization of the revenue-maximizing auction does not re-
quire any knowledge of the model by the bidders, since dominant strategy imple-
mentation is possible (see Mookherjee-Reichelstein [1992]), but it assumes a lot
of knowledge by the seller. Our model reverses this assumption: the seller can
maximize revenues without any knowledge of the distributions of types among the
bidders, by relying on the fact the bidders know the distributions of types of ri-
val bidders. In fact, it is only necessary that one bidder knows the distribution
of another bidder’s type. This alternative information structure seems relevant for
ﬁrms within the same sector, whose common experience may have brought some
knowledge about their rivals’ characteristics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section oﬀers a quick review of Myerson’s IPV
model and of the implementation of the optimal auction therein. Section 3 deals
with the case of an ignorant seller and presents our main result in terms of universal
implementation. Section 4 discusses some extensions and limitations of the result.
In particular, it shows how to extend the game in the non-regular framework and it
explains how to strengthen our weak implementation result in order to get unique
implementation of the optimal auction outcome.
42 Revenue-maximizing auction in the benchmark
model.
We consider the classical auction setting with Independent Private Values (IPV),
as analyzed in Myerson [1981]. A risk-neutral seller wants to maximize her revenue
from the sale of an indivisible good for which her valuation is known and normalized
to 0. There are n risk-neutral potential buyers, each with private information on
his own valuation vi for the good. Valuations vi, i = 1,...n are independently
drawn from continuously diﬀerentiable distributions Fi(.), with densities fi(.) and
full support [vi, ¯ vi]. Moreover, we will concentrate on the so-called regular case
where each bidder’s virtual valuation function is monotone increasing: formally, we
assume that, for any i,
Ji(vi) ≡ vi −
1 − Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
is increasing in vi.4 These distributions are common knowledge among all agents.
Before addressing the auction design problem, let ﬁrst consider the corresponding
pricing problem of a monopolist with unit cost b facing demand [1 − Fi(p)]. Let ﬁrst
Pi(b) denote the optimal monopoly price:
Pi(b) ≡ argmax
p {(p − b)[1 − Fi(p)]}. (1)
In our regular framework, Pi(b) is single-valued and invertible and we have: P
−1
i (vi) ≡
{b|vi = Pi(b)} = Ji(vi).
The optimal revenue-maximizing auction has been proved to be such that the
good be transferred to bidder i with valuation vi if:
Ji(vi) ≥ sup{sup{Jh(vh),h 6= i},0}, (2)
that is to the bidder with the highest non-negative virtual valuation. In case of
4As explained in Section 4, our results can easily be extended to the general, i.e. non-regular,
case.
5equality, any tie-breaking rule can be used.
The outcome of the revenue-maximizing auction can be implemented (in domi-
nant strategies) using a direct revelation mechanism, with the appropriate payment
function: the winner pays the lowest valuation that would have made him win. Al-
though in the symmetric regular case, the revenue equivalence theorem shows that a
ﬁrst-price, or a second-price, or else an ascending auction, all with reservation price
J−1(0), yield the optimal outcome, it is diﬃcult in more general cases to ﬁnd a nat-
ural indirect mechanism, such as a standard auction, that implements the optimal
auction.
Bulow-Roberts [1989], however, shows that the seller’s problem is formally equiv-
alent to a third-degree price discriminatory monopoly problem with capacity con-
straint. Facing perfectly identiﬁable demand functions [1 − Fi(p)] for i = 1,2,...n,
such a monopolist should optimally sell to the buyers with the highest marginal rev-
enue. In the regular setting, the revenue functions Ri(Q) ≡ QF
−1
i (1−Q) are strictly
quasi-concave, or equivalently when the functions Ji(.) are all strictly increasing, the
optimal monopolistic policy is to compare marginal revenues R0
i ([1 − Fi(vi)]), that
is Ji(vi) for i = 1,...n, and to allocate the good to the buyer with highest marginal
revenue.
This interpretation of Bulow-Roberts [1998] translates into a simple implemen-
tation procedure of the optimal outcome. Bidders participate in an ascending-bid
auction with initial bid starting at zero. The winner is the last participant to drop
out (or drawn among the last participants to drop out, with equal probabilities).
The “winning bid” is the highest bid for which the number of active bidders is larger
or equal to 2. If at least one bidder participates and bidder i wins at winning bid
b ≥ 0, he gets the good and pays Pi(b) = J
−1
i (b) to the seller; otherwise, the good is
not sold.
The key feature of this procedure is that it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for
each bidder to bid his virtual valuation. For i of type vi it is a dominant strategy
to stay active whenever b is such that vi > Ji(b) and drop out whenever vi < Ji(b),
6i.e. to stay active until the price reaches the value Ji(vi). Moreover, one can easily
check that the payments are identical to the ones speciﬁed in Myerson [1981] (page
69, expression (6.8)). We summarize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. : (Bulow-Roberts) The optimal auction can be implemented in
dominant strategies through an ascending-bid auction with payments given by the
functions Pi(.).
Game 1 follows a common index procedure, ”a common clock”: the index in-
creases until only one participant remains, thereby determining the winning bid and
the winner. This bid only serves as a basis to determine the actual payment by the
winner, based on the winner’s virtual valuation function. The ﬁnal allocation and
payment rules can be seen as resulting from a monopoly pricing decision against
the winning bidder where the monopolist’s cost is determined by the winning bid.
This payment could be extracted in a take-it-or leave-it oﬀer game by any interme-
diary facing a cost equal to the winning bid and knowing the prior distribution of
valuations for the winner. We exploit this idea below.
3 Universal implementation in the regular case
The previous implementation game is not informationally demanding for bidders.
The dominant strategy implementation procedure puts no requirement on the knowl-
edge bidders have upon each others and upon the market conditions as a whole. The
auctioneer, however, needs to be able to maximize (p − b)[1 − Fi(p)] for all i and
b. Basically, she needs to know the distributions of valuations Fi(.) for each bidder
i. Such a requirement may be unrealistic. In many cases, the auctioneer has little
knowledge about the parameters of the market, at least compared to the knowledge
actual participants in the market have from long years of practice and competition
within the market.
In this section, we propose a “universal”, or detail-free mechanism which the
auction designer can set up independently of her knowledge of the bidders’ tastes.
7Doing so, we completely reverse the informational requirement by assuming that
participants in the auction are better informed than the auction designer upon
the distribution of tastes among bidders. More precisely, we will assume that the
distributions Fi(·) are common knowledge among bidders.5 On the other hand, we
do not need specify what are the seller’s prior, if any, on these distributions, since the
mechanism we present implements the optimal auction whatever the distributions
Fi(.). In this mechanism, competition among participants is used as a device to
induce participants to implicitly reveal the optimal sale price.
It is important to note there are many mechanisms which can force bidders to
reveal to the auctioneer the information necessary to implement the optimal auction.
Clearly, selecting among the possible games raises methodological issues. Following
the seminal work by Maskin [1977], many studies have been done on Bayesian Nash
implementation.6 The basic conclusion of this literature is that information which is
common knowledge among agents can be revealed at no cost to the principal. One
way is to ask agents to reveal simultaneously their joint information and, if they
fail to send the same information, to impose inﬁnite penalties on them. We propose
an easily interpretable procedure where the seller organizes the auction in a rather
conventional fashion and let competitive pressure works in her favor to extract the
maximum expected rents. The game is meant to be intuitive and practical.7
Let us consider the following game Γ:
1. Bidders participate in an ascending-bid auction, starting from bid zero. The
winner i and the winning bid b are determined as in a standard ascending bid
auction and the outcome (i,b) is publicly disclosed.
2. If i wins, he volunteers a price p which is also publicly disclosed.
5As will appear, we could simply assume that it is common knowledge that for each i, there is
another bidder c(i) 6= i who knows Fi(.).
6See Moore [1992] for a survey on implementation under complete information and Palfrey
[1992] for a survey on Bayesian implementation.
7Pursuing a similar quest for simple implementation procedures, Glazer-Ma [1989] have analyzed
implementation with the possibility of challenges. The procedure we propose also incorporates the
possibility of challenges.
83. If i has won at winning price b and has volunteered a price p, another agent
is randomly designated and can challenge p by proposing a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer at a higher price q > p, which i can accept or refuse; payments are as
follows:
• if p is unchallenged, then i receives the unit and pays p to the seller.
• if a challenge q > p is accepted by i, then i receives the unit, pays a fee
∆ to the seller and pays q to the challenger. The challenger pays p to the
seller.
• if a challenge q > p is rejected, the seller keeps the good, receives a fee ∆
from i and a payment p − b from the challenger.
In contrast with the ascending-bid auction with pre-speciﬁed payments described
in Proposition 1, the winner is asked to volunteer a payment and the game is designed
so that the winner has indeed an incentive to volunteer the optimal auction payment.
He is disciplined in doing so by the possibility of challenges from an informed outside
agent, who is able to compute the optimal auction payment based on his knowledge
of the prior distribution of the winner’s valuation and on the public information
about the winner and the winning bid.
More precisely, we have the following central result:
Theorem 1. : Game Γ universally implements the optimal auction outcome. That
is, the following strategies and beliefs form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of Γ in
which the seller obtains the same revenues as if she knew the distribution Fi(.):
• bidder i of type vi exits at bid Ji(vi);
• when winning at bid b, bidder i volunteers p = Pi(b);
• after he has won at winning bid b and volunteered price p, bidder i of types vi
accepts all challenges such that q ≤ vi and refuses others; challengers update
their prior Fi(.) conditional on the event {vi ≥ Pi(b)}, they propose a price
q = Pi(b) if and only if p < Pi(b) and abstain otherwise.
9Proof. After winning at b, bidder i should accept a challenge if and only vi−q−∆ ≥
−∆, hence if and only if q ≤ vi.
A challenger looks for the challenge price q that maximizes his expected proﬁt,
where the expectation is taken with respect to his posteriors on the winner’s type
vi after observing that i wins at winning bid b and volunteers price p. Suppose
that the challenger’s posteriors are given by the Bayesian updating of his priors,
conditional on the event {vi ≥ Pi(b)}.8 In this case, if indeed b < ¯ vi,9 the program











where the inﬁmum corresponds to the challenger’s probability assessment that the
challenge q will be accepted. The optimum challenge price then corresponds to:
q = Pi(b). This is indeed the challenge price if it is strictly larger than p; otherwise,
the value of the program above is strictly negative when restricted to q > p, and p
is not challenged.
Suppose that bidder i wins at winning bid b. Proposing a price p < Pi(b)
generates a challenge q = Pi(b). It cannot be an equilibrium strategy for bidder
i to encourage a challenge that he will accept, since he could have immediately
proposed p = Pi(b), thereby avoiding to pay the fee ∆. Therefore, the maximal
proﬁts that bidder i of type vi can obtain after winning at winning bid b are equal
to: sup{vi − Pi(b);−∆}. These proﬁts are non-negative if and only if b ≤ Ji(vi) or
vi ≥ Pi(b). It follows that by dropping out in the ascending auction precisely at bid
Ji(vi) and by proposing the unchallengeable price p = Pi(b) when he wins, bidder i
of type vi maximizes his expected gains.
Finally, the beliefs that have been posited are actually Bayesian consistent. They
8Note that posteriors do not depend upon the price proposal p, although this proposal could
serve as a signalling device for the winner.
9If b > ¯ vi, the beliefs proposed in the text are not compatible with the history of the game.
One can ﬁx beliefs to be concentrated on {vi = ¯ vi}, resulting in q = ¯ vi. The same challenge price
should be considered if b = ¯ vi.
10are deduced from Bayes rule after history (i,b). The fact that p does not induce a
further updating is consistent with the fact that among all types vi ≥ Pi(b), it is a
full pooling equilibrium to volunteer the same price p = Pi(b); therefore, p does not
convey any additional information about the winner’s type.
To summarize, Game Γ admits a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that implements
the optimal auction outcome whatever the actual distribution of types Fi(.). In
this equilibrium, bidders drop out at their virtual valuation Ji(vi), the winning
bid therefore coincides with the highest second virtual valuation. When they win,
bidders submit the lowest unchallengeable price to avoid paying the fee ∆; this price
corresponds to the highest valuation that would have still enabled them to win the
ascending auction, Pi(b), i.e. the corresponding optimal auction payment.
The challenger’s program (3) can be viewed as the program of a monopolist
facing demand Q = 1 − Fi(q) and unit cost b (for q ∈ [Pi(b), ¯ vi]). So, the game
relies on the existence of other agents who have priors Fi(.) on i’s valuation and can
challenge the volunteered payment when it is lower than the corresponding monopoly
price. The seller in fact delegates the monopoly pricing decision discussed in the
previous section to one better informed intermediary as an oﬀ-equilibrium threat
that serves as a disciplining device to induce the correct price proposal by the winner.
Note that for the system to work, the challenging agent need not be interested in
purchasing the good for himself, he need only be motivated by the possibility of a
proﬁtable arbitrage. Note also that the challenge could alternatively be organized as
a competition game between potential challengers where only the largest challenge
price is considered, or as a (common value) auction between potential challengers
so as to win the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the winner of the ﬁrst
auction.
114 Extensions and discussion
4.1 Implementation in the non-regular case
The analysis is more technical when the functions Ji(.) are not monotone increasing
and we only sketch it here. (1) now deﬁnes a set of optimal monopoly prices. Let
ti(b) and ri(b) denote respectively the lowest and the largest elements in Pi(b) and
let Hi(vi) be the (unique) value b such that vi ∈ [ti(b),ri(b)].10 The function Hi(.)
is obtained by ironing out the function Ji(.) so that it is weakly increasing. The
optimal revenue-maximizing auction now requires to transfer the good to bidder i
with valuation vi if:
Hi(vi) ≥ sup{sup{Hh(vh),h 6= i},0}. (4)
The maximal revenue can be obtained via an ascending bid auction, as in Propo-
sition 1, except for the exact form of the payment function: if bidder i wins at
winning bid b, he must now pay a weighted average of ti(b) and ri(b) whose weights
depend upon the number of ties at the winning bid.11
The game form Γ, consisting of an ascending-bid auction followed by a challenge
stage, provides a universal implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction in
this case provided it is modiﬁed so as to mimic the more complex structure of the
payments in the revenue-maximizing auction. Formally, a winner of the ascending-
bid auction is now required to volunteer two prices p1 and p2, with.p2 ≥ p1, among
which the seller randomizes so that the expected price corresponds to the appropriate
weighted average price where p1 and p2 are treated as ti(b) and ri(b) respectively.
Another bidder can then challenge the price randomly drawn with a strictly higher
price.
10Under the assumption that Fi(.) is continuously diﬀerentiable, if b < b0, then ri(b) < ti(b0) and
limb0↓b ti(b0) = ri(b). Hence the expression Hi(vi) is well-deﬁned.
11The precise form of the payments in case of simultaneous exits by several bidders at the winning
bid can be found in Myerson [1981]. If i is the sole winner and m bidders dropped out at b, bidder
i must pay p = 1
m+1ti(b) + m
m+1ri(b). If i wins as the result of a random draw among several
bidders, he must pay ti(b).
12In this modiﬁed game Γ, bidder i of type vi participates up to the point where
the ascending price reaches Hi(vi); when he wins at bid b, bidder i proposes p1 =
ti(b) and p2 = ri(b); these price levels are also the appropriate challenge prices.
This equilibrium induces the same expected proﬁt for the seller as if she knew the
distributions Fi(.) and had organized the optimal auction in the more usual way.
Again, this mechanism provides a universal, or detail-free implementation pro-
cedure of the revenue maximizing auction outcome in a detail-free manner.12 The
appendix sketches the formal and technical analysis.
4.2 Strong implementation
Let us come back to the analysis of the regular case. Take any strictly increasing
function bi(.) such that for all vi, bi(vi) ≤ Ji(vi). Consider the following strategies:
bidder i of type vi drops out in the ascending auction at bid bi(vi); if he wins at
b, he volunteers a price p = b
−1
i (b) (if b > bi(vi), and vi otherwise) and beliefs on







. It is easy to see that Program (3) is still valid after
replacing Pi(b) by b
−1
i (b). Under the regularity assumption and since Pi(b) ≤ b
−1
i (b),
the optimal challenge price is then obtained as a corner solution at q = b
−1
i (b) (or
vi). The argument is then similar to the one developed above.
The proposed strategies and beliefs therefore constitute another perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of Game Γ. Game Γ has indeed a continuum of equilibria. All the
equilibria rely on a less aggressive behavior from bidders in the ascending auction
compared to the equilibrium that implements the optimal auction; the challenging
stage then induces higher prices, for a given winning bid b. Multiplicity of perfect
Bayesian equilibria should not be a surprise. One can construct “unreasonable”
equilibria by allowing potential challengers to have unreasonable out-of-equilibrium
beliefs leading to high challenges q.
12The mechanism is less appealing because it is less simple than in the regular case. But the
payment structure in the optimal auction is itself quite complex, so that one should not expect to
ﬁnd a simpler implementation procedure.
13Theorem 1 is therefore a weak implementation result, but we can exploit the
speciﬁc properties of the various equilibria to strengthen our point. A ﬁrst point that
can be made is that the equilibrium that implements the revenue-maximizing auction
is not any equilibrium. As a limit equilibrium, it has a focal point property; moreover
it is the unique equilibrium where beliefs on and oﬀ equilibrium are concentrated
on {vi, such that vi ≥ p}.
To go one step further, we will restrict beliefs out-of-the-equilibrium path and
impose a reﬁnement of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept that generates a
unique equilibrium; then, we can argue that the equilibrium in Theorem 1 can be
interpreted as the only reasonable equilibrium in Game Γ. For this purpose, we
apply here the concept of explicable equilibrium due to Reny [1992].
The idea underlying the notion of “explicable” equilibrium is that when a devia-
tion is detected, the other participants must interpret this deviation not necessarily
as an irrational move on the part of the deviator but, whenever possible, as the
result of some confusion over which equilibrium is being played. Whenever possi-
ble, a deviation should be interpreted as a best-response to some other equilibrium.
Formally, let B be some common standard of behavior and let π be some strategy
proﬁle in B. Now suppose that for i 6= j, (a) an information set, h, for j is inconsis-
tent with i’s strategy proﬁle; (b) h is both consistent with i using the distinct pure
strategies s and s0; (c) s is a best response relative to B while s0 is not, where s is a
best response to B if there exists an element γ ∈ coB such that s is a best response
against γ. Then, according to the notion of explicable equilibrium, if h is reached,
j’s reference about i’s strategy should put zero probability on s0 being played.
In the context of our game, the notion of explicable equilibrium has suﬃcient
bite if we set B to be the set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. It can eliminate all
equilibria characterized by a bi(.) function such that b
−1
i (b) > Pi(b) with strictly
positive measure. Consider such an equilibrium and suppose an information h is
reached where i wins the auction at some price b and, as in the previous sub-
section, oﬀer p = Pi(b) < b
−1
i (b). We know that the strategy s used by bidder i in
14the implementation equilibrium consists of bidding according to Ji(.) and oﬀering
p = Pi(b), and it is a best-response to the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria. However,
any strategy s0 for i that consists of bidding according to a bi(.) function such that
b
−1
i (b) > Pi(b) with positive probability, and of oﬀering p(b) = Pi(b) is not a best-
response relative to the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria: p(b) = Pi(b) lies oﬀ the
equilibrium path and either this price is challenged, in which case i could have
proﬁtably proposed a higher p, or it is not challenged, in which case i did not






bid up to b






to win at price p. Hence, the challengers’ inference about i’s play must put zero
probability on all strategies where i bids up to b only if vi ≥ b
−1
i (b) > Pi(b), for any
candidate bi(.)-function. Since oﬀering p = Pi(b) is a strictly dominated strategy
if vi < Pi(b), the challengers’ inference must then be that vi ≥ p = Pi(b). This
again nails down beliefs oﬀ-the-equilibrium path. Following the discussion in the
previous subsection, it selects a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome, the
equilibrium that implements the optimal auction outcome.
The conclusion of this analysis is that the equilibrium that leads to the opti-
mal auction outcome has very special features that suggest that it constitutes a
reasonable outcome of our simple implementation procedure.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a game form that implements the optimal auction in a relatively
simple way without requiring extensive knowledge on the part of the auctioneer. The
key features of Game Γ are that the winner of the auction does not pay the winning
price of the auction; she pays some price that is determined afterwards through
some well-deﬁned bargaining process. This is not very diﬀerent from some current
practices. Often the competitive process is meant only to identify a winner, the
actual price and contract conditions are bargained afterwards between the interested
15parties.
The result of this paper has many limitations. We have restricted our attention
to the case of private and independent values and the case of risk-neutral bidders.
We also assume that one and only one unit is on sale, we do not consider how
the logic here applies to multi-auctions with multi-unit demands. Our last concern
relates to the repetition of these auctions. The presumption that participants are
well-informed about the distributions of valuations of other participants reﬂects the
notion that they all share a common experience and that these auctions are often
repeated. If this is true, then collusion may arise: as a rule buyers may agree never
to challenge each other. So, we view this paper as a ﬁrst step in the pursuit of
ﬁnding practical implementation procedures for optimal auctions.
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18A Appendix: the general case
In the non-regular case, we consider the following game:
1. Bidders participate in an ascending-price auction as in Game 2, with public
disclosure of the winner and the winning bid (i,b).
2. If i wins, he volunteers two prices p1 and p2, with p2 ≥ p1. If i dropped
out at the winning bid (tie between potential winners), the seller sets p =
p1. Otherwise, the seller sets p = p1 with probability 1
m+1 and p = p2 with
probability m
m+1, if m bidders simultaneously dropped out at b.
3. The price p is publicly disclosed, as well as whether p is equal to p1 or p2.
Another agent can then challenge p as in Game Γ.
We provide a sketch of the formal proof of the following result:
Theorem 2. : Each Perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the game in this
Appendix is characterized by a proﬁle of left-continuous non-decreasing functions
µi(.) such that for all b ≥ 0,
µi(b) ∈ arg max
q≥µi(b)
[(q − b)[1 − Fi(q)]],
and of non-decreasing functions ηi(.) deﬁned by: ηi(b) = lim
b0↓b
µi(b0), such that:
(i) in the ascending auction, bidder i bids up to bi(vi) deﬁned as the value of b
such that vi ∈ [µi(b),ηi(b)], if it is not smaller than 0, or drops out immediately at
0 otherwise;
(ii) when he wins at winning bid b, bidder i submits prices p1 = µi(b) and p2 =
ηi(b);
(iii) there is no challenge.
For every such proﬁle, there exists an equilibrium that yields the corresponding out-
come.
19Note that ti(.) and ri(.) satisfy the conditions in the theorem; moreover, the
expected price is equal to the price in the optimal auction for p1 = ti(b) and p2 =
ri(b). Hence the general implementation result.
A.1 Suﬃciency
We ﬁrst prove that for any proﬁle of left-continuous increasing functions µi(.) and
associated proﬁle of functions ηi(.), the following strategies sustain the corresponding
outcome as an equilibrium. Bidder i bids up to b such that vi ∈ [µi(b),ηi(b)]. If i
wins the initial auction at value b, he volunteers payments p1 = µi(b) and p2 = ηi(b).
These prices are unchallenged. However, if p = p1 < µi(b), it is challenged and the
challenger oﬀers q = µi(b), and if p = p2 < ηi(b), the challenger oﬀers q = ηi(b).
Consider the challenger’s beliefs when i wins at winning bid b and m bidders
apart from i dropped out at b. If p = p1, it must be that either i also dropped out at
b and was randomly selected with probability 1
m+1 or that i dropped out above b but
p = p1 was announced, which had probability 1
m+1. The posterior beliefs therefore
coincide with the Bayesian updating of prior beliefs conditional on {vi ≥ µi(b)}. If
p = p2 is announced, posterior beliefs must be the Bayesian updating of prior beliefs
conditional on {vi > ηi(b)}.
Given these posterior beliefs, whenever p = p1, it is sequentially rational to
challenge p if p < µi(b) and oﬀer q = µi(b) since µi(b) ∈ argmaxq≥µi(b)(q − b)[1 −
Fi(q)]. The case p = p2 is similar..
Given the response of potential challengers, if i wins the initial auction at price
b, his best strategy is to oﬀer p1 = µi(b) and p2 = ηi(b) unless vi < µi(b) − ∆ in
which case he oﬀers a challengeable price, pays ∆ and ends up not receiving the
good. So let ˆ b be the value at which the last of all other participants drops out.
Bidder i gets negative payoﬀs if he wins and vi < µi(ˆ b) and he gets positive payoﬀs
if he wins and vi > ηi(ˆ b) or if he drops out exactly at ˆ b and µi(ˆ b) < v < ηi(ˆ b). His
best-response is indeed to bid up to the value b such that vi ∈ [µi(b),ηi(b)].
20A.2 Necessity
Consider an equilibrium with bi(.) the bid (or exit price) functions, pi1(b,vi) and
pi2(b,vi) the price proposals, and a decision rule which speciﬁes whether to challenge
i and, if so, at which price qi(b,p,{p = pk}). Let Yi = {x|∃v such that bi(v) = x}
denote the support of i’s bids and Y−i = ∪j6=iYj. Let dGi(b) denotes the equilibrium
measure corresponding to the probability that i wins at the winning bid b.
Claim (i): For dGi-almost all b ∈ Y−i, deﬁne the following: µi(b) ≡ sup{vi,bi(vi) <
b} and ηi(b) ≡ sup{vi,bi(vi) ≤ b}; then, in equilibrium bi(vi) < b if vi < µi(b),
bi(vi) = b if µi(b) < vi < ηi(b), and bi(vi) > b if vi > ηi(b).
The claim asserts that in equilibrium, bid functions must necessarily be increasing
when they are relevant.
Proof of Claim (i). Let Ui(vi,bi) denote the expected payoﬀs of bidder i of type vi
who bids up to bi. Consider two possible bids bi and b0
i, with bi > b0
i and bi ∈ intY−i.
If Ui(vi,bi) ≥ Ui(vi,b0






where the index ui(vi,p1,p2,b) stands for bidder i’s expected payoﬀ (in equilib-
rium) when he is of type vi, wins at winning bid b and proposes prices (p1,p2).
ui(vi,p1,p2,b) may coincide with one of i’s two equilibrium proposals, vi − p1 or
vi − p2, or with an accepted challenge, vi − qi(b,p,{p = pk}) − ∆, or else with a
rejected challenge, −∆; it is strictly increasing in vi when it is non-negative. The
inequality above implies that within (b0
i,bi), the integrand is non-negative on a set
of positive dGi-measure on which it is then strictly increasing in vi. Therefore, for
all v0












i). The result follows.
Claim (ii): Suppose that i wins at winning bid b ∈ Y−i, then along the equilib-
rium path, i oﬀers p1(b,vi) = µi(b) and p2(b,vi) = ηi(b) which are almost never
challenged, for dGi-almost all b ∈ Y−i.
Proof of Claim (ii). For b ∈ intY−i, let k1(b,vi,i) (a similar argument exists for
k2(b,vi,i) corresponding to p2) denote the eﬀective price paid by i along the equi-
librium path whenever he wins at bid b and p = p1.
Let k∗
1(b,i) ≡ inf{vi≥µi(b)} k1(b,vi,i). We show that k∗
1(b,i) = µi(b) almost always,
in the sense of dGi. Suppose that k∗
1(b,i) < µi(b), i.e. there exists one vi ≥ µi(b)
for which the eﬀective price along the equilibrium path is less than µi(b). It cannot
correspond to a rejected challenge since vi + ∆ > µi(b); it cannot correspond to an
accepted challenge or to an unchallenged price either, since the challenger would
strictly beneﬁt from challenging at a price q such that k1(b,vi,i) < q < µi(b), which
would surely be accepted given posterior beliefs concentrated on {vi ≥ µi(b)}.
Suppose now that there exists an interval (b0,b0 +) ⊂ Y−i and δ > 0 such that:
∀vi ∈ (µi(b0),µi(b0) + δ),∀b ∈ [b0,b0 + ), k
∗
1(b,i) > vi.
A bidder i of type vi in this right-neighborhood of µi(b0) would have been strictly
better oﬀ by submitting a bid strictly lower than b0, which contradicts the deﬁnition
of µi(.). Hence k∗
1(b,i) = µi(b).
From this, it follows that if there is a challenge in equilibrium, it must be accepted
and must occur at price q = µi(b)−∆. But this price cannot correspond to a rational
challenge since a challenger knows that the winner i must have valuation vi ≥ µi(b)
and would therefore accept a slightly higher challenge price with probability 1. So it
is necessary that i winning at b volunteers p1 = µi(b) and that there is no challenge
whatever her type vi ≥ µi(b).
Claim (iii): Along the equilibrium path, when i wins the auction at b for dGi-
22almost every b ∈ Y−i, then µi(b) must be such that:
µi(b) ∈ arg max
q≥µi(b)
(q − b)[1 − Fi(q)] (5)
Proof of Claim (iii). Given Claim (i), when a challenger faces the winner i at
winning bid b and with p = p1, he should have beliefs corresponding to the updating
of prior beliefs conditional on {vi ≥ µi(b)} and should not ﬁnd any proﬁtable chal-
lenge. If there were a q > µi(b) such that (q−b)[1−Fi(q)] > (µi(b)−b)[1−Fi(µi(b))],
there would exist such a strictly proﬁtable challenge against p1. The same holds for
ηi(b). Hence the Claim.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
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